THREAT ASSESSMENT: Fragility in High-Tech Supply Chains Undermines Strategic Autonomy in the Indo-Pacific
![full screen view of monochrome green phosphor CRT terminal display, command line interface filling entire frame, heavy scanlines across black background, authentic 1970s computer terminal readout, VT100 style, green text on black, phosphor glow, screen curvature at edges, "SINGLE-POINT FAILURE: SUPPLY CHAIN LINK SEVERED", monospace green text glowing faintly on deep black background, text slightly blurred as if out of focus, cold ambient light from screen only, silent and isolated atmosphere [Nano Banana]](https://081x4rbriqin1aej.public.blob.vercel-storage.com/viral-images/a431f31c-4d2e-478d-8fb3-399dd17213af_viral_0_square.png "full screen view of monochrome green phosphor CRT terminal display, command line interface filling entire frame, heavy scanlines across black background, authentic 1970s computer terminal readout, VT100 style, green text on black, phosphor glow, screen curvature at edges, \"SINGLE-POINT FAILURE: SUPPLY CHAIN LINK SEVERED\", monospace green text glowing faintly on deep black background, text slightly blurred as if out of focus, cold ambient light from screen only, silent and isolated atmosphere [Nano Banana]")
If technological rivalry weaponizes interdependence, strategic autonomy becomes economic necessity.
Bottom Line Up Front: Middle powers face growing threats to economic security from technological rivalry and supply chain fragmentation, requiring coordinated investment in trusted innovation networks to maintain open strategic autonomy.
Threat Identification: The intensification of geopolitical competition—particularly between the U.S. and China—is driving weaponization of economic interdependence, disrupting global value chains in AI semiconductors, quantum technologies, energy systems, and critical raw materials. This creates strategic vulnerabilities for open, export-dependent economies like South Korea and the Netherlands [HCSS/KIEP, 2026].
Probability Assessment: High likelihood of escalation within 1–3 years (2026–2029), as major powers expand export controls, investment screening, and technology nationalism. Disruptions in semiconductor supply or rare earth access are already observable and expected to intensify [Vierhout’s Control Points Framework, HCSS/KIEP 2026].
Impact Analysis: Unmitigated, these trends risk eroding industrial competitiveness, delaying dual-use innovation, and forcing inefficient duplication or over-reliance on single suppliers. In defense contexts, this could compromise operational readiness and interoperability among allied nations [Patrahau, van Houts et al., Part II, HCSS/KIEP 2026].
Recommended Actions:
1. Establish joint Dutch-Korean R&D hubs in AI chips and quantum sensing with shared IP frameworks.
2. Co-develop diversified sourcing strategies for critical raw materials via trusted partner networks (e.g., EU-Indo-Pacific Mineral Alliance).
3. Align standard-setting efforts in emerging tech through multilateral forums (e.g., OECD, G7).
4. Institutionalize regular economic security dialogues between European and Indo-Pacific middle powers.
Confidence Matrix:
- Threat Identification: High confidence (supported by multiple expert contributions and institutional analysis)
- Probability Assessment: Medium-high confidence (based on observed trends and policy momentum)
- Impact Analysis: High confidence (grounded in sectoral case studies and historical precedents)
- Recommended Actions: Medium confidence (dependent on political will and resource allocation)
Citations: HCSS/KIEP (2026), 'Industrial Open Strategic Autonomy in the Indo-Pacific'; Vierhout, Ghiasy, Patrahau, van Houts et al. [various chapters]. Commissioned by Dutch and Republic of Korea Ministries of Foreign Affairs.
—Marcus Ashworth
Dispatch from Moves S2
Published January 10, 2026